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a

asserts

a

by the United States and Idaho Constitutions, was

right to a

violated because of the prosecutor's misconduct in this case. Specifically, Mr. Nelson
asserts the prosecutor struck multiple "foul blows" during closing argument by
impermissibly vouching for the investigating officer and the prosecutor and by appealing

to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury, and this prosecutorial misconduct
amounted to fundamental error.

The

filed a Criminal Complaint
conduct with a child under

1

of

child

battery

Mr. Nelson

committed one

in violation

§ 18-

by lewd or

on a

to seventeen years of age, felony, in violation of I

(R., pp.1

3.) After Mr.

waived his preliminary hearing,

him over to the district court

(R., pp.30-31.)

The State then

§ 18-1508A(1)(a).

magistrate bound
a Prosecuting

Attorney's Information charging Mr. Nelson with the above two offenses. (R., pp.32-33.)
The

later

the

the sexual battery count.

the

(R., pp.35, 43-47.)

Mr. Nelson entered a not guilty plea.

(R., pp.51-52.)
The matter proceeded to a jury
judge

(R., pp.106-14.) During voir dire, another

as a

1

1

15 -

108,

7.)

remove

(Tr.,
hang

150,

- p.1

d

jury that a

13.)

with K.M. at Mr. Nelson's house,

in Mr. Nelson's basement.

(Tr., p.1

days

and Mr. Nelson played Truth or
159, L.14, p.162, L.1 - p.166,

L.24 -

During the game, Mr. Nelson had C.F. touch Mr. Nelson's penis through his
and outside his clothing

(Tr., p.166, L.16- p.172, L.2, p.174, L.2 - p.175, L.25.)

also testified he thought Mr. Nelson touched C.F.'s penis through his pants.
(Tr.,

177, L.7- p.178, L.4.)
C.

further testified that when he was seventeen years old, Mr. Nelson got him

Nelson's downstairs bedroom and started fondling C.
p.203,

12 - p.205, L.25.) Mr. Nelson
were in contact. (Tr., p.206,

's penis.

(Tr., p.201,

manually masturbated them both
7.)

testified that when he was seventeen years

he was

Mr. Nelson's

bathroom when Mr. Nelson persuaded him to have Mr. Nelson trim his pubic hair.
(Tr., p.189, Ls.8-18, p.191, L.1 - p.194, L.18, p.201, Ls.9-14.) C.F. stated that while
Mr. Nelson was cutting the hair around C.F.'s testicles, he cut C.F.'s scrotum with his
scissors. (See

, p.194, L.19 - p.195, L.3.) Mr. Nelson then put C.F.'s penis in his

mouth. (Tr., p.195, Ls.3-6, p.197, Ls.7-8.) C.F. testified the incident in the bathroom
was the last instance of sexual contact he had with Mr. Nelson. (Tr., p.200, Ls.18-25.)
C.F. testified there were two or three other times when Mr. Nelson put C.F.'s
penis in his mouth, but he was having trouble recalling the details. (Tr., p.209, L.25 -

2

1

mother.

the

his

1.)

, p.220, L.21 - p.228,

and C.

They called the

a forensic

interview and then spoke with Detective John Marley of the Idaho Falls Police
Department. (Tr., p.229, L.25 - p.232,
On cross-examination,

12;

see Tr., p.292, L.21 - p.293, L.7.)

testified

he might have told the forensic

he was sixteen during the bathroom incident. (Tr., p.255, Ls.8-11.) He also
that Mr. Nelson cut his scrotum

testified that he did not tell the forensic
during the bathroom incident. (Tr., p.260, L.19
remember telling the

p.261,

18.) Additionally, C.F. did not

interviewer about the two or three other instances where
Ls.8-22) Nor did

Nelson performed oral sex on him.

remember

in

forensic
On

(Tr., p.266, Ls.8-20.)
seen the forensic interview.

examination, C

(Tr., p.272, Ls.21-23.)

testified the prosecutor told him not to review the forensic

interview or police report, because

prosecutor wanted C.

's testimony to be based

on honesty and sincerity. (Tr., p.273, Ls.3-21.)
The investigating officer, Detective

testified that he attended C.F.'s

forensic interview and watched it via television. (Tr., p.298, L.11 - p.299, L.22.) He
then tried to have a confrontation call with Mr. Nelson, but never completed a call.
(Tr., p.302, L.13 - p.303, L.15.)

3

an

a

Nelson

p.308, L.3.)

incident

and

(Tr.,

310,

11,

.)

When Detective Marley asked questions on whether Mr. Nelson had even been alone
C.

, Mr. Nelson stated C.F. one time had cupped his genitals while C.F. was

intoxicated. (Tr., p.311,

11 - p.313, L.7.) According to Detective Marley, Mr. Nelson

stated he later spoke with C.

in his bedroom about that incident, and C.F. had no

memory of it because he was

. (Tr., p.313,

8 - p.314, L.4.)

Detective Marley testified he also told Mr. Nelson that C.F. had disclosed the
basement incident during the forensic interview.
Nelson denied any sexual

(Tr., p.315, L.18 - p.316, L.4.)

or any knowledge

the Truth or Dare game.

316, Ls.5-6.)
The investigating officer testified he brought

the bathroom incident, and

Mr. Nelson at first denied going into the bathroom or having any contact with C.F. in that
way.

(Tr., p.316, L.10 - p.317,

1.)

Detective Marley testified Mr. Nelson later

changed his story and admitted to agreeing to trim C.F.'s pubic hair. (Tr., p.317, L.2 p.318, L.1.) According to Detective Marley, Mr. Nelson stated he trimmed C.F.'s pubic
hair, but he did not believe he was touching C.F. in a sexual manner. (Tr., p.318, L.2 p.319, L.7.)

Detective Marley told Mr. Nelson he did not believe one could trim

somebody's pubic hair without touching their genitals in a sexual way. (Tr., p.319, Ls.812.) Mr. Nelson eventually stated he had manual contact with C.F.'s genitals, and that

4

's

on

1

a

1,

. (Tr.,

audio had
- p.330, L.7.)

, p.329,

recorded, he

his

After the video of the interview was admitted and
depicted

were played for the jury, Detective Marley testified the video

trimming

making a trimming motion with his hands when
's pubic hair. (Tr., p.331,

- p.339, L.10.)
Marley testified he

cross-examination regarding the video excerpts,
could not

Mr. Nelson was talking about when Mr. Nelson made several other

hand gestures

excerpts from the video of the interview.

(Tr., p.340, L.24 -

L 12.)
.,

a

drinking with
to

p.

over.

, p.360,

- p

in
1,

car

, p.369,

L.25.) Robin Nelson, Mr. Nelson's wife, testified that nothing about C.F.'s and
Nelson's behavior stood

when they were around each

Mr. Nelson were never alone when she was at the house. (Tr.,
p.385, L.7 - p.386,

377,

and C.F. and
- p.378, L.3,

11.)

Mr. Nelson testified that C.
K.M. became friends, and that C.

would regularly visit the Nelsons' home after he and
even lived

them for about a month. (Tr., p.404,

15 - p.406, L.25.) After C.F. and K.M. were both placed on probation, Mr. Nelson toid

5

over

C.

1
never asked C.F.

penis over

had C.F. touch it. (Tr.,

15,

pants, and he never pulled his

10-15.) Mr. Nelson further testified that

he never asked C.F. to rub his penis while in the garage, never rubbed C.F.'s penis over
pants, and never engaged in mutual masturbation with C.F. while alone in
Nelson's bedroom. (Tr., p.415, L.17 - p.417, L.10.) He stated C.F. had cupped him
and about a week later he had a talk with C.F. alone in the bedroom about the
incident and C.

did not remember the incident because he had been intoxicated.

(Tr., p.416, Ls.4-21.)
Mr. Nelson also testified he asked C.F. to stop coming over after K.M. told him
an incident where C.
17,L.11-p.418,

15.)

had been drinking and driving with K.M. in the car.
F.came

and after Mr. Nelson told him to leave,

to

Nelson'shouseaboutaweek

called Mr. Nelson a child molester.

(Tr., p.419, Ls.3-23.)
Mr. Nelson testified that when he had the interview with Detective Marley, he was
floored when Detective Marley stated C.F. had made sexual allegations. (Tr., p.421,
11 - p.422, L.10.) Mr. Nelson told the investigating officer there was nothing he knew
of that could be misinterpreted as being sexual. (Tr., p.424, Ls.8-14.) Detective Marley
gave Mr. Nelson more and more information about the allegations as the interview
continued. (Tr., p.424, L.15 - p.425, L.1.) Mr. Nelson told Detective Marley he had only
been alone once with C.F. (Tr., p.427, Ls.9-19.) He did not tell Detective Marley he
performed oral sex on C.F., nor did he state he offered to trim C.F.'s pubic hair.
6

's

n

hair as
hand gesture was

(Tr.,

5-23.)

remember what the other hand gestures concerned.
Nelson had explained to C.F. different
trim C.F.'s pubic haif. (Tr., p.434,

2.)
that he was not saying Detective
he may have misunderstood what

was lying about the

agreed the suggestion that Detective

Nelson said. (Tr., p.443, Ls.2-7.) Mr.

like putting your mouth on a juvenile's penis

would sound ridiculous in some cases. (Tr.,
on

that

him he trimmed
video were
C.

p.432, L.5.)

to trim his pubic hair, but never offered

On cross-examination, Mr. Nelson

Marley would misunderstand a

(Tr., p.431, L.24

1
was

1.)

Nelson later testified

told

when

's

hair at C.F.'s request, and that the scissor hand motions

when

r. Nelson described

about trimming pubic hair with

(Tr., p.452, L.22 - p.454, L.2.) He did not tel! Detective Marley there was sexual

contact in the bathroom or that he performed oral sex on C.F. (Tr., p.454, L.14 - p.455,
L.7.)

On redirect examination,

Nelson testified the advice he

C.F. about

trimming pubic hair was supposed to be funny, not serious. (Tr., p.470, Ls.9-16.)
While the jury was deliberating, they submitted a jury question asking: "What
happens if some say guilty and some say innocent?" (Tr., p.513, Ls.14-16.) The district
judge who had been a prospective juror, "filling in" for the district judge who presided

7

over

a
of

of a

to seventeen

age (lewd or

- p.520, L.11.) The district judge who had

lascivious acts). (R., p.103; Tr., p.51

been a prospective juror also presided over the reading of the jury verdict. (Tr., p.519,
Ls.2-6.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a
unified sentence of twenty-five years, with five to ten years fixed at the district court's
discretion. (Tr., p.

, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Nelson recommended the district court consider

a suspended sentence with a term of probation of about ten years; or retained
jurisdiction; or, if sentence were

, a unified sentence of ten years, with around

two years fixed. (Tr., p.542, L.20 - p.543,
twenty-five years,

18.) The district court imposed a unified
fixed. (R., pp.170-71;

, p.562, Ls.6-

10.)
Mr. Nelson then filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") motion for a
reduction of sentence. (R., pp.183-85.) After conducting a hearing, the district court
denied the Rule 35 hearing. (Tr., p.565, L.3 - p.572, L.12.)
Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of
conviction and the denial of the Rule 35 motion. 1 (R., pp.188-92.)

On appeal,
Rule 35 motion.

1

Nelson

not challenge the district
8

denial of the

9

Nelson asserts

State violated his right

a

trial, guaranteed by the

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts
closing argument.

prosecutorial misconduct during

Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct during

closing argument by vouching for the credibility of the investigating officer and the
and by appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. These
prosecutorial

"foul

blows"

committed

during

closing

arguments

amounted

to

fundamental error and this Court should vacate Mr. Nelson's conviction in light of
misconduct.

Standard Of Review
Nelson did not object in the district court to

of the prosecutor's comments

(See generally Tr., p.483,

- p.501, L.6.) As the Idaho

during closing argument

Supreme Court has held, "[w]here prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial,
Idaho appellate courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that
as fundamental error." State v.

150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

Fundamental error review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears
the burden of showing that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
not contained in the appellate

information as

the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. Id.
10

C.

proceedings.

right

I§ 13.

amends. V & XIV § 1; Idaho Const.

Idaho

U

Const.

Court has held that,

"[w]hiie our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is
0

v,"' ,..,·r
0

0

r1

to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is nevertheless expected and

required to be fair."
marks omitted).

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011) (internal quotation

But a court reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct "must

keep in mind the realities of trial.

A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial."

Id.

(citation omitted).
While a prosecutor "may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."

State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 354 (1973) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.

88 (1935)

misconduct occurs

when the prosecutor "attempts

on any factor other than . . .

evidence admitted during trial, including

inferences that may be drawn from

that evidence," or when the prosecutor "[a]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the
jury through use of inflammatory tactics." State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, _ , 348
P.3d 1, 81-82 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The prosecutor's comments at issue here all took place during closing argument.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "[c]losing argument serves to sharpen and
clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case." State v. Gross,
146 Idaho 15, 18 (Ct. App. 2008). The purpose of dosing argument "is to enlighten the
jury and to help jurors remember and interpret the evidence."
11

Id.

"Both sides have

are

V.

d

1
constitute

closing

error only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any
consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." Abdullah, 158 Idaho at
_ , 348 P.3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1.

Violation Of The Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial

The first prong of fundamental error review here asks whether the prosecutor
Mr. Nelson's constitutional right to a fair trial by committing misconduct.
asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the credibility
of
or

investigating officer

the

and by appealing to

emotion, passion

of the jury.

a.

Vouching For The Credibility Of The Investigating Officer

Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the
credibility of the investigating officer. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued
that, with respect to the interview of Mr. Nelson conducted by Detective Marley, "[s]o
then we get down to Detective Marley is lying, or the defendant is lying

Right?"

(Tr., p.493, Ls.1-3.) The prosecutor continued: "I mean, we're dealing-now-so let's
walk through that a step at a time. Let's say-and I'm trying to do this very objectively,
because the absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my
skin crawl." (Tr., p.493, Ls.4-8.)

12

a

Idaho
a

by placing

information not given

prestige of

state behind

or referring to

the jury that supports the witness." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho

364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that the prosecutor's vouching
for the credibility of witnesses poses two dangers: first, "such comments can convey the
impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor,
supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's
right to a fair trial," and second, "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it
the Government and may induce the jury
than its own

trust the Government's judgment rather
v. Young, 470 U

United

the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of
expressing a personal belief as

imprimatur of

1, 1

9 (1985).
Marley by

the credibility of Detective Marley that was not based

on inferences from evidence presented at trial. The prosecutor urged the jury to believe
Detective Marley not because of the evidence presented at trial, but "because the
absurdity to suggest Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin crawl." (See
Tr., p.493, Ls.5-8.) The prosecutor expressed his personal belief as to the credibility of
Detective Marley, and that personal belief was based not on inferences from evidence
presented on trial but on the prosecutor's own visceral reaction.

See Adamcik, 152

Idaho at 481-82. Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct. See Gross, 146 Idaho at
19-20.

13

police

of
said.

The stories match up with regard to

"but that's
the defendant's

acknowledged, but [Detective ]Marley's lying to you." (See Tr., p.494, Ls.13-18.) The
prosecutor then argued: "Well, if he's lying to you-I don't mean to sound terrible, but I
can do a better job.

I mean, if you want me to lie to you, we can do a better job.

Okay?" (Tr., p.494, Ls.18-21.) According to the prosecutor, "I mean, he can sit here
he admitted this, this, this.
Okay?

He can tell you all of that.

(Tr., p.494, Ls.21-24.)
when

He even

us where Jimmy Hoffa's buried.

That's what he can do, but it's not the truth."

Further, the prosecutor argued, "[a]nd to suggest he's lying
lie could easily have been much better .

" (Tr., p.494,

1.)
The prosecutor's comments on how

can

a

job" in coming up with a

aligned Detective Marley with the prosecutor and emphasized the prosecutor and the
witness were working together on the same team. The prosecutor argued both he and
the investigating officer were capable of telling "better" lies, and therefore the jury
should believe the account of

prosecutor and Detective Marley.

(See Tr., p.494,

L.13 - p.495, L 1.) Those comments are akin to the comments of the prosecutor in

Gross, where the prosecutor "suggest[ed] that the jury should trust and believe the
officer and prosecutor because they represented the state and, therefore, must be
ethical." See Gross, 146 idaho at 19-20. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Gross held the
prosecutor's comments, by arguing "the jury should believe the story of the officer and
14

were
case was more

that the

a
Marley

they were representatives of

State, inducing the jury "to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of
evidence." See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.
The prosecutor's comments on

job" in coming up with a

can do a

also referred to facts not in evidence. Compare Gross, 146 Idaho
comments, that "I would

my job" and "[t]he arresting officer would lose
to facts not in evidence), with

job" if they presented altered

Wheeler, 149 Idaho

369 (holding the prosecutor's comments on "[i]s [the officer]

to risk his career to make

did not expressly

was an

do a better job in lying,

See Gross,

146

a fact not in

a common sense

determination).

evidence.

20 (holding that

By declaring that

and the investigating

prosecutor expressly referred to facts not in

Idaho at 20. Thus,

the prosecutor's comments

were misconduct.

c.

Appealing To The Emotion, Passion Or Prejudice Of The Jury

Mr. Nelson further asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by appealing to
the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. Specifically, the prosecutor invited the jury

to imagine themselves as the alleged victim. During closing argument, the prosecutor
CF was credible even though his

on what happened

contained discrepancies on the number of incidents of sexual contact. (See Tr., p.488,
15

12

on d

's

11.)

in

came

11.) The prosecutor continued:
There was differences on amount of times. I mean, can you imagine
going in-we've discussed this forensic interview. It was discussed
briefly. But can you imagine going in, your mom's brought you to the
police station, you've given a little snippet of what's going on, and you sit
down in front of some handsome young lady, and you've just turned 18,
and you're sitting in front of some lady, and she's asking you about all of
the sexual activity you did with a 40-something-year-old.
, p.489, Ls.12-21.) The prosecutor argued he was not suggesting C.F. "was trying to
deceptive to her. What I am suggesting, you think he's going to hold some things
You think he's going to not acknowledge, or not understand?
memory's just simply different.

Which would you prefer?

Or maybe his

That's always the issue."

, p.489, L.22 - p.490, L.2.)
Idaho

Court has held: "[A]ppeals

jury through use of inflammatory
62.

Gross, the prosecutor

emotion,

are impermissible.

or prejudice

Ellington, 151 Idaho

the members of the jury "to image themselves as

a hypothetical victim of Grass's alleged drunk driving and asserting that 'his client's
wanted to protect the members of the jury from becoming that hypothetical victim."

Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21. The prosecutor's comments "did not ask the jury to rely on
evidence, but, rather, urged the jury to find Gross guilty of the DUI charge based on
a fear of being the victim of a drinking and driving accident serious enough to be on the
front page of a newspaper."

Id. at 21.

The Idaho Court of Appeals held those

comments improperly appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through
the use of inflammatory tactics. Id.
16

it

some

a

is also
v. Cherry,

1977) (holding

A.2d 800,

prosecutor's statement asking the jurors to imagine themselves as crime victims and
imagine the difficulty

State's key witness had in testifying "improperly invoked

sympathy of the jurors for" the witness, "suggested that the jury should render a
based on sympathy for the witness rather than

guilt or innocence of the

accused," and prejudiced the defendant); Commonwealth v. Olmande, 995 N.

797,

1 (Mass. App. 2013) ("[T]he defendant alleges the prosecutor, in effect, instructed the

to place themselves in [the alleged victim's] shoes by asking them to 'image'

speaking about the incident

a sexual assault 'to a group

is

strangers.'

agree. It

into

arouse juror sympathy."); State v. McDaniel,
1995) (holding that the

E.2d 882, 883-84 (S.C. Ct. App.

use of "'you' or a form of 'you' some forty-five times,

asking the jury to put themselves in the place of the victim" during an alleged rape, while
it to the police, and while testifying at trial, was reversible error).

Here, the prosecutor invoked jury sympathy by inviting the jury to step into
shoes of the alleged
forensic interviewer.

, C.

, at the time he reported the alleged offenses to the

The prosecutor's comments did not ask the jury to find C.F.

credible despite the discrepancies in his testimony, and thus find Mr. Nelson guilty, on
the basis of the evidence presented at trial. Rather, the comments urged the jury to find
Mr. Nelson guilty based on imagining themselves being placed in C.
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's position and

use

tactics. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21.
for the credibility of the prosecutor

the prosecutor's comments

investigating officer and appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury by
asking the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim, the prosecutor
misconduct that violated Mr. Nelson's constitutional right to a fair trial.

2.

Plain Error
second prong of fundamental error
the error plainly
In

appellate

without

for prosecutorial misconduct asks
need for any additional information not

including

as to whether the failure to

was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Here, it cannot be said
failure to object was a tactical decision. With respect to the prosecutor's
comments vouching for the credibility of
failure to object

prosecutor and the investigating

not provide a possible tactical advantage. Rather, the

placing the prestige of the State

the witness, see Wheeler, 149

at 369, left the defense at a tactical disadvantage by suggesting the jury should
the prosecutor and investigating officer based on considerations outside the
evidence presented at trial.
Further, with respect to the prosecutor's comments appealing to the emotion,
passion or prejudice of the jury, it was not possible that counsel's failure to object was a
tactical decision. C.F's credibility 'vVas central to the State's case. (See, e.g., Tr., p.489,
- p.490, L.14 (arguing that C.F. was not being dishonest despite the discrepancies

18

was more

7

L.13 -

was

and

Nelson guilty

inviting the

failure to object on this core

cannot be

into the shoes of

F.,

as a tactical

not draw further attention to the passing reference." Cf. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho
533, 543 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding counsel's failure to object to a prosecutor's statement
"attempt[ing] to describe the scene-albeit from the victim's perspective" was possibly a
tactical decision, and the defendant did not point to any contrary evidence in
record).

3.

The

misconduct

fundamental error
of C.

case.

Detective

credibility was

(See, e.g., Tr., p.492, L.1 - p.493, L.3.) The

its case would hinge on

(See, e.g., Tr., p.512, Ls.19-20 (arguing during

jury's

argument rebuttal, "[aJs I said from the beginning,
and you

was central to the

your verdict").) Otherwise,

example, C.

out who's lying to you,

State's evidence was not overwhelming.

's account of what happened contained numerous discrepancies.

(See, e.g., Tr., p.255, Ls.8-11, p.260, L.19 - p.261, L.18, p.265, Ls.8-22, p.266, Ls.820.)

Additionaliy, without the audio from the police interview with Mr. Nelson (see

Tr., p.327, L.22 - p.329, L.16), the State could not conclusively show Detective Marley's
account of the interview was

as opposed to Mr. Nelson's alternative account.

19

the

and thus find

to

guilty, "based on factors

evidence."

Gross, 146 Idaho

21.

prejudiced Mr. Nelson's case because, individually, each instance of misconduct
was "so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments
should be disregarded."

See Abdullah, 158 Idaho at

, 348 P.3d at 59 (internal
of misconduct by the

marks omitted). Considered individually,

prejudiced Mr. Nelson's case and therefore constituted fundamental error.
Even though the jury acquitted him on the lewd conduct charge, Mr. Nelson's
case was still prejud
Kuhn

Cf State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 716 (Ct App. 2003) ("[T]he

on one

jury did not

arguments.")
the intensity

case is distinguishable from Kuhn

the prosecutor's misconduct

"calling a witness a liar." See Kuhn, 139

was more than merely

716. As discussed above, the prosecutor in

the instant case vouched for the investigating officer and himself, and appealed to the
emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. This misconduct, being more egregious than
misconduct in Kuhn, meant that fundamental error occurred in this case.
Because fundamental error occurred here through the State's prosecutorial
misconduct, Mr. Nelson's conviction must be vacated and the case must be remanded.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; Gross, 146 idaho at 22.
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